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Abstract: Wigner’s friend is commonly invoked in discussion of quantum mechanics
and its interpretation.. but who is the friend really? The publishing context of Wigner’s
article is not widely appreciated. A recent paper by Ballentine is relevant.
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We are introduced to his friend by Wigner in his contribution to a book [1] which
has the subtitle ‘An anthology of partly-baked ideas’. This anthology was collected
and edited by the distinguished statistician (and computer pioneer) Irving J. Good.1
The article, Remarks on the Mind-Body Question, has been reprinted in Ref. [2] and
in Ref. [3] but neither of these mentions the subtitle of the original book. While one
shouldn’t judge an article just by the company it keeps, it is certainly interesting that
the same collection includes Harlow Shapley’s ‘Concerning Life on Stellar Surfaces’ and
Marvin Minsky’s ‘Winking at Computers.’ Browsing the list of 123 contributions, it is
obvious that many contributors took the challenge of producing something worthy of
the book’s subtitle very seriously. Maybe Wigner did too.
It is well known that, at one time, Wigner’s resolution of the measurement problem of
quantum mechanics involved human consciousness. It is also well known that in due
course Wigner abandoned the idea that human consciousness could solve the measure-
ment problem. Wigner’s famous article, written in 1962, Ref. [4] (also included in the
article collections, Refs. [2, 3]) does not call upon human consciousness, but leaves the
measurement problem as. . . a problem.
Wigner[1] quotes Heisenberg who, in an article of 1958 wrote: ‘The conception of ob-
jective reality evaporated . . . into the mathematics which represents . . . our knowledge
of the behavior [of elementary particles]’. However, on the other hand, Heisenberg also
wrote [5]: ‘The criticism of the Copenhagen interpretation rests . . . on the anxiety that
. . . the concept of “objective reality” . . .might be driven from physics. As we have
exhaustively shown here, this anxiety is groundless . . . ’. Heisenberg evidently changes
his mind and in Ref. [6] he writes: ‘Certainly quantum theory does not contain a gen-
uine subjective feature, it does not introduce the mind of the physicist as a part of
an atomic event.’ But it is the first of these contrasting Heisenberg statements that
Wigner takes as justifying the viewpoint underlying the rest of the article:
When the province of physical theory was extended to encompass micro-
scopic phenomena, the concept of consciousness came to the fore again: it
1Wikipedia gives the publication date as 1965 with publisher Capricorn Books. I purchased my
copy in 1963 or 1964, and it was published in 1962.
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was not possible to formulate the laws of quantum mechanics in a fully
consistent way without reference to consciousness.
At the heart of Wigner’s argument is a rather artificial model (Ref. [1], p.289) and here
is what he concludes from it:
It is at this point that consciousness enters the theory unavoidably and
unalterably.
It is soon after this that his friend enters the fray:
It is natural to inquire about the situation if one does not make the obser-
vation oneself but lets someone else carry it out . . . One could attribute a
wave function to the joint system: friend plus object, and this joint system
would have a wave function also after the interaction, that is after my friend
has looked.
It is legitimate to pause here and consider ‘. . . the joint system: friend plus object’: a
wave function is a solution to Schro¨dinger’s equation but the living, breathing, per-
spiring friend has an indeterminate number of leptons and baryons and has therefore
no determinate hamiltonian, hence no determinate Schro¨dinger equation and hence
no wave function. While Schro¨dinger’s cat fable serves its original purpose, the usual
re-tellings of the story omit to mention what we now know about decoherence and
entanglement with the environment.
When ‘wave function’ enters the discussion, as it does centrally in Wigner’s account, one
may ask: Into what logical categories might an entity styled ‘wave function’ belong?
To the category ‘marks on a page, blackboard etc.’? Yes, it can. To a category
‘element of a mathematical formalism’? Yes. Solution to Schro¨dinger’s equation? Yes.
According to context, to all of them and more: perhaps ‘wave function’ sometimes
refers to the entity of which some of the others are representations? Maybe such an
entity could collapse; after all, it is characteristic of what is called a ‘measurement’,
that ‘something’ that existed, suddenly exists no longer. Entities in none of the first
three categories could be said to ‘collapse.’ So how would we place in a category
something that might logically be said by some people to collapse and that could still
be referred to as a wave function? Maybe something represented by an element in
a formalism and which could perhaps (logically) be said to collapse? I do not think
that this matter is clarified where, at one point Wigner writes ‘. . . the wave function is
only a suitable language for describing the body of knowledge ...’ So do we now have
a language collapsing? Shortly after that, the wave function becomes ‘a convenient
summary’ . . . can summaries collapse? It is easy to be too literal minded, especially
when reading an article aimed at a popular audience, but then it is also an article
that forms a key part of a recent argument [7] challenging the consistency of quantum
mechanics. Many discussions of the interpretation of quantum mechanics muddy the
water as ‘wave function’ moves from category to category. But one thing seems clear:
one cannot attribute ‘a wave function to the joint system: friend plus object’ to any
acceptable category.
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The key role of consciousness pervades the whole of Wigner’s article. For example,
it is embedded in the argument on pages 292 - 294 of [1] which ignores the vastly
different level of complexity between a ‘friend’ and an atom (taking ‘simple physical
apparatus such as an atom’, p. 293, to mean ‘atom’, since nothing macroscopic would
be appropriate). Wigner also specifically assumes a quasi-Cartesian concept of mind —
mind that does not influence the body. It is surely universal experience that thoughts
in the mind can influence the body, so perhaps a completely non-standard meaning
applies to ‘mind’ in the article; however it is written as though a standard meaning
applies. Incidentally, isn’t it a misuse of the term to describe as ‘cat states’ systems
that share none of the characteristics of cats, such as continuous complex interaction
with the environment?
Wigner’s friend is sometimes invoked (not by Wigner [1]) in accounts, e.g. Ref. [7], of
the Schro¨dinger’s cat situation. Recall, that Schro¨dinger’s intention was to show that
the exclusively linear operation of his equation, and the associated unitary transfor-
mation of the state, was not acceptable, since that would lead e.g. to ridiculous feline
situations. As a result we now have have various alternatives such as deBroglie-Bohm
(for material particles), or ‘many worlds’ where unitary transformations continue. But
mostly we still have the measurement problem, possibly involving collapse models. But
what we do not have is superposed dead and alive cat states. The model that is as-
sumed by most physicists in their working lives is that there is some sort of expansion
into the macroscopic world that occurs very long before the possibility of superposed
dead and alive cats arises, any more than we ever see superposed alternative tracks in
cloud chambers [8]. The conclusion then is that the presence of a friend of Wigner in
the Schro¨dinger cat situation could make no difference whatever.
In a recent article [9], Leslie Ballentine confirms that Wigner publicly disavowed the
proposition that consciousness causes collapse, CCC. His ‘friend’ scenario invokes CCC,
and consciousness is invoked by Wigner throughout his article. Arguably, it is time
for a serious debate as to whether Wigner’s friend should ever be invited to serious
discussions relating to the interpretation of quantum mechanics.
A true giant of physics like Wigner, with an unassailably great reputation, has every
right to contribute to a collection of partly baked ideas. It is a pity that most reprintings
of the article omit to mention its context as given in the book’s subtitle. Most readers
are apparently unaware of this context.
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